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Towards a Public Law of Privacy: 
Meeting the Big Data Challenge 
Lisa M. Austin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Privacy law, to the extent that it regulates state information practices, 
wears two “public” hats. The first hat is constitutional law. For example, 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 protects privacy through 
protecting individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. The 
second hat is public sector data protection law modelled on what are 
known as Fair Information Practices (“FIPs”). For example, in Canada 
the federal Privacy Act2 regulates the collection, use and disclosure of 
personal information held by government institutions and provides 
individuals with a right of access to that information. We might say that 
the constitutional hat is concerned with state-individual relations in the 
context of law enforcement while the data protection hat is concerned with 
state-individual relations in the context of administering state programs. 
This article calls into question the ongoing relevance of this divide. 
One of the strengths of the data protection law model is that it 
addresses the issue of privacy in relation to information systems. One of 
the big challenges facing Charter jurisprudence on privacy is that the 
constitutional framework is best suited to address privacy concerns 
associated with the state accessing a particular “bit” of information, not 
the way in which these bits are now being collected as parts of 
information systems that support new kinds of investigatory techniques. 
Consider, for example, some of the techniques that the Snowden 
                                                                                                                       
* University of Toronto Faculty of Law. Earlier versions of this article were presented at 
the 2014 Constitutional Cases Conference, April 10, 2015, Osgoode Hall Law School; at the 
“Surveillance and the Law” panel at Law and Society Association, Seattle, May 2015; and at the 
Privacy Discussion Forum, Paris, June 2015. I would like to thank the participants for their 
comments. I would also like to thank Julia Dryer for our discussions regarding s. 1 of the Charter. 
All errors remain mine. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21. 
542 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
revelations have highlighted, where large amounts of data about people 
who are not suspected of anything are collected in order to create 
analytic tools that allow for new forms of identification and targeting. If 
the Charter is going to face its “Big Data” moment, then it needs some of 
the resources of data protection law.  
At the same time, data protection law does not have the resources to 
deal with the concern that is at the heart of section 8: the confrontation of 
the individual with the coercive power of the state. This is increasingly a 
problem given that Canada’s Privacy Act is being pressed into service to 
protect privacy in the context of greater governmental information 
sharing for the purposes of national security. For example, Canada’s new 
Security of Canada Information Sharing Act,3 enacted by Bill C-51, 
dramatically increases information sharing between government 
institutions in order to facilitate “Big Data” techniques and the only 
privacy protections on offer are the government’s claims that the Privacy 
Act continues to apply.4 The problem is that in the data protection law 
model there are so many exceptions to the application of privacy 
protections in the context of both law enforcement and national security 
that it offers much weaker protection than the constitutional model of 
privacy protection. In order to inject constitutional considerations into the 
data protection law model, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has called 
for an additional focus on necessity and proportionality, drawing upon the 
test from R. v. Oakes5 to outline reasonable limits on rights.6 However, this 
grafting of the Oakes test does not attend to the differences between the kind 
of balancing that takes place within the Oakes framework and that which 
takes place within section 8 of the Charter in determining whether an 
expectation of privacy is reasonable  differences which this article 
                                                                                                                       
3 S.C. 2015, c. 20, s. 2. 
4 See Lisa M. Austin, “Anti-Terrorism’s Privacy Sleight-of-Hand: Bill C-51 and the 
Erosion of Privacy” in Edward M. Iacobucci & Stephen J. Toope, eds., After the Paris Attacks: 
Responses in Canada, Europe, and Around the Globe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015) 
[hereinafter “Austin, ‘Anti-Terrorism’s Privacy’”]; Craig Forcese & Kent Roach, “Stumbling 
Toward Total Information Awareness: The Security of Canada Information Sharing Act” (2015) 
12(7) Canadian Privacy L. Rev. 
5 [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
6 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Expectations: A Guide for Submitting 
Privacy Impact Assessments to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (March 2011); 
These ideas of necessity and proportionality were also stressed by the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada in his submissions on Bill C-51: “Submission to the Standing Committee on Public Safety 
and National Security of the House of Commons”, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
March 5, 2015, online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/parl/2015/parl_sub_150305_e.asp>. 
(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) BIG DATA CHALLENGE 543 
 
argues are important. It seems clear that if data protection law is going to 
offer meaningful privacy protection in relation to government 
information practices in the era of Big Data, then it needs some of the 
resources of the constitutional law of privacy and not just the 
constitutional law of reasonable limits on rights more generally.  
The merging of these two frameworks is a large project to both 
undertake and defend. This article only purports to offer some initial 
reflections on a potential merger, focusing on recent Supreme Court 
cases, including R. v. Spencer,7 Wakeling v. United States of America8 
and R. v. Fearon.9 First, this article outlines some of the ways in which 
our Charter jurisprudence already adopts some of the insights that come 
out of the data protection law model and points to some of the ways in 
which this can be built upon. Next, the article outlines the potential 
problems of using data protection law framework in the context of law 
enforcement and anti-terrorism if the limitations of data protection are 
not well understood when balancing interests. Finally, it finishes with 
some proposals about how merging the two models might better address 
some new types of “Big Data” investigatory techniques, or, what we now 
all describe post-Snowden, collecting-the-haystack-to-find-the-needle.  
II. PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
The idea of informational privacy protected by both constitutional 
law and data protection law is remarkably similar in its abstract 
expression by Canadian courts and other legal decision makers. For 
example, the Supreme Court has accepted Westin’s definition of privacy 
as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others”.10 This is also the definition often invoked by 
Canada’s federal, provincial and territorial privacy commissioners when 
interpreting and discussing the data protection law regime.  
                                                                                                                       
7 [2014] S.C.J. No. 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, 2014 SCC 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Spencer”]. 
8 [2014] S.C.J. No. 72, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 549, 2014 SCC 72 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Wakeling”]. 
9 [2014] S.C.J. No. 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fearon”]. 
10 R. v. Quesnelle, [2014] S.C.J. No. 46, 2014 S.C.R. 390, at para. 34 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, 2004 SCC 67, at para. 23 (S.C.C.); citing A.F. 
Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967), at 7. 
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Despite this similarity, there is a big difference between the two 
frameworks. The concerns that prompted the adoption of data protection 
statutes such as the Privacy Act are well captured in the 1972 Canadian 
report of the Task Force on Privacy and Computers.11 The focus was on 
computerized information systems and their acceleration of social trends 
towards every-increasing accumulation, centralization and distribution of 
data.12 As the Task Force states, “[i]nformation systems — computerized or 
not — cannot themselves invade personal privacy, but their use almost 
inevitably entails it.”13 We need to read statutes like the Privacy Act from a 
systems perspective. The issue is not whether a particular “bit” of 
information collected is private information, the issue is how to protect 
privacy overall within a system that collects, uses and discloses so many 
“bits” of information. Therefore the threshold question of such regimes is 
whether something is “personal” information (defined as information about 
an identifiable individual) and not whether it is “private” information. 
The focus of Charter jurisprudence in the area of informational privacy 
has been quite different, for many cases are centrally concerned with the 
question of whether a particular “bit” of information is private or not. The 
Charter is engaged only where there is a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy”. Much of the Charter jurisprudence on privacy indicates that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy is much narrower in scope than 
personally identifiable information. For example, the Charter context is 
dominated by considerations such as whether the information at issue falls 
within one’s “biographical core” or is “specific and meaningful”.14  
This Charter focus on the privacy of bits rather than the privacy of 
systems creates potential problems in assessing modern information 
surveillance techniques which have much in common with the information 
systems targeted by data protection law: many “bits” are collected in order 
to be put together and used in different ways; they are thought to raise 
privacy concerns but these concerns are not entirely about the “bits” 
themselves but how the system as a whole operates.15 However, the recent 
                                                                                                                       
11 Task Force on Privacy and Computers, Privacy and Computers (Ottawa: Information 
Canada, 1972) [hereinafter “Task Force, Privacy”]. 
12 Id., “Introduction”. 
13 Id., at 16. 
14 See R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.) and R. v. M. (A.), [2008] 
S.C.J. No. 19, 2008 SCC 19 (S.C.C.). 
15 For a good discussion of the problem of “bits” in the context of the dog-sniffer cases, see 
Ian Kerr & Jena McGill, “Emanations, Snoop Dogs and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” (2007) 
52:3 Crim. L.Q. 392. 
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Supreme Court of Canada decision Spencer calls this distinction between 
bits and systems into question, although it does not get rid of it entirely.  
In recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber 
information, and also in recognizing that informational privacy protects an 
interest in anonymity, Spencer brings the Charter understanding of privacy 
and the Privacy Act understanding of privacy closer together. 
In Spencer, the Supreme Court held that the police must get a warrant 
to obtain subscriber information from telecommunications companies, and 
that informational privacy contemplates the protection of anonymity. One 
of the challenges in the case was to understand whether subscriber 
information attracted a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme 
Court acknowledged that sometimes it is difficult to determine the “subject 
matter of the search” and that when it is difficult then the Court “has taken 
a broad and functional approach to the question, examining the connection 
between the police investigative technique and the privacy interest at 
stake”.16 Therefore instead of considering whether subscriber information 
understood as some kind of isolated bit of data attracts a reasonable 
expectation of privacy (or is merely like phone book information, an 
analogy pressed by the Crown), we need to understand that the police were 
seeking subscriber information in order to identify a particular individual 
and link him to his online activities. In doing so, police infringed that 
individual’s anonymity. This shift from asking about the privacy interest in 
the “bit” of information to situating collection of the “bit” within a 
technique takes us towards thinking about privacy in information systems.  
Another important aspect of Spencer’s discussion of anonymity is 
the Court’s acknowledgment of privacy in public. Spencer follows the 
trajectory of Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United 
Food and Commercial Workers, Local 40117 in acknowledging that 
individuals can have privacy interests in information exposed to the 
public in some way. According to the Court, “[t]he mere fact that 
someone leaves the privacy of their home and enters a public space does 
not mean that the person abandons all of his or her privacy rights, despite 
the fact that as a practical matter, such a person may not be able to 
control who observes him or her in public.”18 Anonymity is engaged 
                                                                                                                       
16 Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 26. 
17 [2013] S.C.J. No. 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733, 2013 SCC 62 (S.C.C.). 
18 Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 44. 
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where activities are in “public” but the author’s identity in relation to 
those activities is not public.  
This is important because it responds to some of the same concerns 
that animate data protection law and underpin its safeguards regarding 
dissemination. The idea is that an individual might be willing to share 
information with one person but not want that information shared with 
some other party. One of the core ideas of data protection law is that 
personal information can only be used or disclosed for the purposes for 
which it was collected, unless the individual consents. There are, of 
course, exceptions that reflect the need to balance privacy against other 
interests. However, this basic idea is what has also informed Charter 
jurisprudence regarding the continuing reasonable expectation of privacy 
an individual might have in information that has been shared with the 
state.19 The fact that the state has collected information, voluntarily or 
not, does not void a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to uses 
of that information that go beyond that original collection. The 
recognition of privacy in public is simply an extension of this principle, 
but a very welcome one. What it recognizes is that there is no crude 
public/private dichotomy but rather multiple social spheres in which we 
live; just because people in one sphere of life know things about an 
individual does not mean that others in another sphere of life must know 
the same things. This is a crucial insight for understanding the privacy 
implications of information systems, for the technological and operational 
impetus behind these systems is to aggregate and match data. In doing so, 
systems easily take information collected in one context and make it 
available for use in another context, raising privacy concerns.20 By putting 
together the insight that privacy is not all-or-nothing with the insight that 
one can focus on techniques and not just “bits”, there is an emerging basis 
to build upon for constitutionally assessing information systems.  
If we read Spencer as attentive to techniques rather than “bits” then I 
think we also avoid a potential misinterpretation of the case. It is not 
accurate to say that Spencer moves away from a biographical core analysis 
to embrace personally identifying information, such as subscriber 
                                                                                                                       
19 See, e.g., R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.). One could argue 
that this already shows the migration of data protection law ideas to constitutional law but a 
discussion of this migration is beyond the scope of this article. 
20 Helen Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy 
in Public” (1998) 17 Law & Philosophy 559; Lisa M. Austin, “Privacy and the Question of 
Technology” (2003) 22 Law & Philosophy 119 [hereinafter “Austin, ‘Privacy’”]. 
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information, as attracting Charter protection. There are a number of aspects 
of the decision that cut the other way. For example, the Supreme Court was 
not concerned about identification per se but emphasized that the police 
were trying to link a particular person to specific and monitored online 
activities that were engaged in anonymously; it is this context of 
identification that is important. The Supreme Court also sometimes uses 
the language of “intimate or sensitive activities being carried out online”, 
which suggests a narrow scope for the protection of anonymity — the 
ability to engage in publicly visible activities that are sensitive and 
intimate.21 This suggests that there remains a “privacy” threshold for 
Charter scrutiny, but the privacy interest must be assessed in light of the 
investigatory technique rather than simply by looking at the nature of the 
information in isolation.  
One aspect of recent jurisprudence that cuts the other way can be seen 
in Moldaver J.’s reasons in Wakeling. In discussing whether the sharing of 
lawfully obtained wiretap information with a foreign state attracts section 8 
scrutiny, Moldaver J. stated that the “disclosure of previously intercepted 
communications” is not a search.22 However, he held that section 8 
nonetheless did apply, since “[t]he highly intrusive nature of electronic 
surveillance and the statutory limits on the disclosure of its fruits suggest a 
heightened reasonable expectation of privacy” that is not extinguished 
once the communications are held by law enforcement agencies.23 This 
suggests that apart from the special case of wiretaps, Moldaver J. would 
equate a “search” under the Charter with the collection of information 
rather than with its subsequent use or disclosure. If this is true, then the 
ability of section 8 jurisprudence to deal with information techniques and 
systems, rather than “bits”, will be seriously compromised. Justice 
Moldaver’s approach also lies in tension with the basic test for a search or 
seizure, which is simply whether a reasonable expectation of privacy  
has been intruded upon. The general reasonable expectation of privacy  
test is consistent with the mandate to interpret the Charter in a broad  
and purposive manner, rather than Moldaver J.’s “plain meaning” 
interpretation of the word “search”.24 However, Moldaver J. (with LeBel 
and Rothstein JJ.) was not in the majority with his approach. For 
McLachlin C.J.C., section 8 can protect against unreasonable uses of 
                                                                                                                       
21 Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 66. 
22 Wakeling, supra, note 8, at para. 32. 
23 Id., at para. 39. 
24 Id., at para. 34. 
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lawfully obtained information.25 For Karakatsanis J. (with Abella and 
Cromwell JJ.), the question was only whether there was a residual 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. 
III. THE LINGERING QUESTION ABOUT BITS 
One of the lingering questions regarding Spencer is how to 
understand the claim that requiring a warrant for subscriber information 
does not impact upon other types of more routine investigations where 
police officers might request information from third parties. The 
Supreme Court discussed this issue and Cromwell J.’s comments are 
worth quoting in full:  
The intervener the Attorney General of Alberta raised a concern that if 
the police were not permitted to request disclosure of subscriber 
information, then other routine inquiries that might reveal sensitive 
information about a suspect would also be prohibited, and this would 
unduly impede the investigation of crimes. For example, when the 
police interview the victim of a crime, core biographical details of a 
suspect’s lifestyle might be revealed. I do not agree that this result 
follows from the principles set out in these reasons. Where a police 
officer requests disclosure of information relating to a suspect from a 
third party, whether there is a search depends on whether, in light of the 
totality of the circumstances, the suspect has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in that information: Plant, at p. 293; Gomboc, at paras. 27-30, 
per Deschamps J. In Duarte, the Court distinguished between a person 
repeating a conversation with a suspect to the police and the police 
procuring an audio recording of the same conversation. The Court held 
that the danger is “not the risk that someone will repeat our words but 
the much more insidious danger inherent in allowing the state, in its 
unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words”: at pp. 43-44. 
Similarly in this case, the police request that the ISP disclose the 
subscriber information was in effect a request to link Mr. Spencer with 
precise online activity that had been the subject of monitoring by the 
police and thus engaged a more significant privacy interest than a 
simple question posed by the police in the course of an investigation.26 
The Court clearly views the request for subscriber information 
differently from “other routine inquiries” but the basis for this is not 
                                                                                                                       
25 Id., at para. 95. 
26 Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 67. 
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entirely clear. Justice Cromwell suggests that there is a “more significant 
privacy interest” at issue here because the police were trying to identify 
the individual associated with specific activities. But that cannot be the 
entire basis of the distinction, for it suggests that the police would need a 
warrant whenever they ask questions of third parties that are aimed at 
identifying the perpetrator of a specific crime, or have a high likelihood 
of such identification. 
Justice Cromwell, in adverting to Duarte, also invokes the issue of 
technology affecting the nature of the privacy interest. There are many 
debates in privacy that go something like the argument that was put to 
the court in Duarte: if I can tell the police what you told me then why is 
it any different for me to record this and pass along the recording? And if 
I can pass along the recording, why is it any different for the police to 
just record our conversation directly? The Supreme Court has called the 
latter a “much more insidious danger”, but the basis of this remains 
unclear as we can see from the argument in Spencer — why is the 
voluntary provision of subscriber information more problematic than the 
voluntary provision of other identifying information in more “routine” 
forms of investigation? 
Sometimes people point to “practical obscurity” as a way of 
understanding the difference that technology makes to our expectations 
of privacy.27 For example, public records that are in paper format and 
stored in specific physical locations are very different from public 
records that are compiled centrally, electronically or otherwise. The 
distributed paper records are difficult to find and compile, so that the 
people they concern are protected by a kind of practical obscurity. 
Technology, in removing those practical barriers to access and 
compilation, eradicates the practical obscurity. In this way, the practical 
protection of privacy is altered even if in both cases (paper access and 
electronic access) the records are, in a normative sense, publicly 
available. There is something like this concern in the context of access to 
subscriber information. Many privacy advocates were worried that the 
absence of a warrant requirement to access subscriber information would 
lead to a situation where this was routinely asked for and provided, 
enabling other types of investigative techniques. Indeed, there is 
evidence that this was exactly what was happening prior to the Spencer 
                                                                                                                       
27 See Austin, “Privacy”, supra, note 20. 
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decision.28 Warrantless access to subscriber information on a large scale 
effectively brings an end to anonymity on the Internet. 
I have argued elsewhere that we should also think in terms of 
“practical constraint” as a way of understanding the difference that 
technology makes.29 Constitutional jurisprudence regarding privacy is 
not simply about defining the nature of the privacy interest at stake but is 
also about ensuring basic rule of law values concerning constraints on 
public power. The worry in cases like Duarte is about the systemic 
effects of permitting the state, in its sole discretion, to determine whether 
and when to record conversations. The key issue here is the “unfettered 
discretion” of the state and what it means in the context of a particular 
technology. Sometimes technology removes a number of “practical 
constraints” that serve to fetter the discretion of the state even if it is not 
always obvious. A simple example is when technology brings down the 
cost of some types of investigatory techniques. If they are costly to 
engage in then the state has a reason to ensure that they are used 
carefully and only when necessary; once such techniques become easy 
and cheap then these practical constraints on their use are removed.  
The practical constraint argument about the voluntary provision of 
subscriber information from telecommunications companies is this. 
When investigatory methods rely upon the participation of community 
members the police have to ensure that they maintain the trust of the 
community or else there will be no participation. Community members 
exercise their own judgment regarding whether and when to cooperate 
with police and this can be informed by many things, including the 
perceived legitimacy of the police investigation. Even where the 
community is not asked to cooperate but police actions are public and 
visible, potential community reaction to their methods is a practical 
constraint on what they might choose to do. Investigations that rely on 
community involvement can also be resource intensive. All of these 
things change when the police ask for access to data from intermediaries 
such as telecommunications companies — it is relatively cheap, invisible 
                                                                                                                       
28 Alex Boutilier, “Millions of police requests for Canadians’ data every year, documents 
show”, The Toronto Star, July 21, 2014, online: <http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/ 
07/21/millions_of_police_requests_for_canadians_data_every_year_documents_show.html>. 
29 Lisa M. Austin, “Enough About Me: Why Privacy is About Power, Not Consent (or Harm)” 
in Austin Sarat, ed., A World Without Privacy?: What Can/Should Law Do (NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014). 
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to the public and the intermediaries exercise their judgment to cooperate 
in a context far removed from the community of the people affected.  
The difference, therefore, between subscriber information and other 
information that might be requested by the police does not lie in the nature 
of the information itself. It has to be understood in relation to the 
investigatory techniques and systems that form the context for its collection 
and use, and how this enables a change in both privacy and accountability, 
understood in terms of both practical obscurity and practical constraints.  
IV. SAFEGUARDS AND THE LIFE CYCLE OF INFORMATION 
In several recent Supreme Court cases, notably Wakeling and 
Fearon, the issue of “safeguards” was prominent in the analysis of 
reasonableness under section 8. This is interesting, for a number of the 
concerns raised are of the type at home in data protection law such as 
concerns about safeguards to limit subsequent uses of information by 
third parties. This suggests another way in which section 8 jurisprudence 
is moving towards a framework that will allow it to deal with the privacy 
implications of information systems by considering the life cycle of the 
information collected. Just like a focus on “bits” of information obscures 
the role of investigative techniques, a focus on a particular moment of 
collection or disclosure obscures the broader life cycle of information 
and the types of vulnerabilities associated with aspects of this cycle. 
Wakeling concerned the constitutionality of Criminal Code30 
provisions that permit the disclosure of lawfully obtained wiretap 
information with foreign authorities. The Supreme Court split three 
ways. Justice Moldaver (with LeBel and Rothstein JJ.) held that while 
there are residual privacy interests associated with wiretap information 
once obtained by the state, the legislative framework for information 
sharing in the Criminal Code is reasonable. Justice Karakatsanis (with 
Abella and Cromwell JJ.) also held that lawfully obtained wiretap 
information still retained a reasonable expectation of privacy but found 
the legislative framework for disclosure unreasonable. Chief Justice 
McLachlin held that although there can be an expectation of privacy in 
information held by the state, section 8 is not engaged where the 
information was collected for law enforcement purposes and is shared for 
law enforcement purposes.  
                                                                                                                       
30 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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The major dispute between Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. was over 
the issue of safeguards, not privacy per se. Privacy violations are 
constitutionally acceptable if authorized by a reasonable law and carried 
out in a reasonable manner. This question of “reasonableness” was the 
grounds of the disagreement and the dispute turned on whether 
safeguards are constitutionally required in order for the privacy violation 
contemplated by the sharing to be found reasonable for the purposes of 
section 8. According to Karakatsanis J., “[t]o render the scheme 
constitutional, Parliament must require the disclosing party to impose 
conditions on how foreign officials can use the information they receive, 
and must implement accountability measures to deter inappropriate 
disclosure and permit oversight.”31 In contrast, Moldaver J. declined to 
require these safeguards in order to render the statute reasonable but did 
indicate that in some factual contexts safeguards might be required in 
order for the actual disclosure to be carried on in a reasonable manner. 
Some of the types of safeguards mentioned in the decision include 
information-sharing protocols, caveats, record-keeping and reporting or 
notice obligations.  
The other recent case to discuss the issue of safeguards is Fearon. 
Fearon concerned the constitutional permissibility of a warrantless 
search of a cell phone incident to lawful arrest. Justice Cromwell, for the 
majority, held that such searches do not violate section 8 of the Charter. 
However, he also held that the common law framework for searches 
incident to arrest required modification for cell phone searches in order 
to add extra safeguards to protect privacy. In addition to requiring the 
arrest to be lawful and the search truly incidental to the arrest, Cromwell J. 
required a strict tailoring of the search that would limit what could be 
accessed and also that the police make records about what they accessed 
and how.32 Record keeping points to another dimension of safeguards, 
which is the possibility of after-the-fact review. Searches of phones and 
computers are not “public” in the sense that those affected can know 
what was searched and potentially complain about overreach or abuse. 
Record-keeping requirements permit a form of review regarding whether 
the police stayed within the boundaries of their authorization. 
                                                                                                                       
31 Wakeling, supra, note 8, at para. 105. 
32 Justice Cromwell also endorsed the use of notes in computer searches in R. v. Vu, [2013] 
S.C.J. No. 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, 2013 SCC 60, at para. 70 (S.C.C.). 
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If the idea of safeguards is developed within Charter jurisprudence, a 
lot could potentially be learned from the data protection law framework 
since so much of it concerns ensuring the information is only used for the 
purposes it was collected. This raises many additional questions, not 
dealt with here, concerning how to operationalize these insights for the 
institutional structure and institutional competencies of the Canadian data 
commissioners is quite different from that of the courts and justices of 
the peace who traditionally oversee warrants. Even if much is to be 
gained normatively from these frameworks informing one another, these 
other important practical issues remain. 
V. DIFFERENT PROTECTIVE FRAMEWORKS AND  
THE QUESTION OF BALANCE 
There remain significant differences between the constitutional 
framework and the data protection law framework when it comes to  
two sets of ideas: (1) necessity and proportionality and (2) accountability. 
By necessity and proportionality I mean the basic idea that intrusions 
into an individual’s privacy interest must be justified. Most justification 
tests incorporate both the idea that the intrusion is necessary, limited to 
only that which is necessary, and that the benefit is proportional to the 
losses associated with the intrusion. By accountability I mean the various 
legal mechanisms that ensure that the only privacy invasions permitted 
are those that are necessary and proportional, including both prior 
authorizations and after-the-fact review.  
The data protection regime was developed to address the information 
practices of the administrative state, especially in the context of the 
increasing combination of computer technology and bureaucratic 
information systems. Its paradigm case is the collection of personal 
information in order to provide some kind of government benefit or 
service to an individual. The ideas of necessity and proportionality 
operate here to ensure, in a variety of ways, that only personal 
information needed for the provision of that benefit or service is 
collected, and that this personal information is only used or disclosed in 
order to provide that benefit or service unless the individual consents.  
In this paradigm administrative case, the individual wants the benefit or 
service at issue. The individual interest is therefore not aligned with 
prohibiting the state from collecting, using or disclosing personal 
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information for the purposes of providing that benefit or service — the 
individual interest lies in ensuring there is no over-collection, no function 
creep and no inaccuracies. One of the key accountability mechanisms in 
such legislation is the right granted to individuals to access their own 
personal information in order to see what has been collected and to 
ensure its accuracy. There are many contexts that depart from this 
paradigm case, and many criticisms that could be made regarding 
whether particular legislation, like the Privacy Act, properly ensures such 
necessity and proportionality.33 However, this basic picture can help to 
highlight the differences between this and the constitutional context, 
which is primarily concerned with law enforcement. Indeed, the Privacy 
Act offers very weak protection in the context of law enforcement and 
national security because of the number of exceptions to the usual 
operation of the Act that are engaged in such contexts. 
Another way to understand the kind of protection offered by data 
protection law is to see it as an example of what it means to bring state 
information practices within a regime of law. As the Task Force on 
Privacy and Computers reported so many years ago, computerized 
information systems can concentrate power in the hands of those who 
operate them.34 In liberal democracies, it is the ideal of the rule of law 
that addresses our concerns about power. According to Waldron,  
“the Rule of Law aims to correct abuses of power by insisting on a 
particular mode of the exercise of political power: governance through 
law.”35 Postema echoes this point, arguing that throughout its history the 
rule of law “has been rooted in the two-fold thought that a polity is well-
ordered when its members are secured against the arbitrary exercise of 
power and that law, because of its distinctive features, is especially if not 
uniquely capable of providing such security”.36 The rule of law is 
traditionally thought to encompass two different ideas: that law should 
provide guidance to individuals and that law should constrain public 
power. In many ways, data protection law aims to ensure that 
government information practices are consistent with these very basic 
                                                                                                                       
33 Indeed, the Privacy Act is much weaker in this respect than the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 [hereinafter “PIPEDA”], which applies to 
the private sector. 
34 Task Force, Privacy, supra, note 11, at 18. 
35 Jeremy Waldron, “The Concept and the Rule of Law” (2008) 43 Georgia L. Rev. 1, at 11. 
36 Gerald J. Postema, “Fidelity in Law’s Commonwealth” in Lisa M. Austin & Dennis 
Klimchuk, eds., Private Law and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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ideas of the rule of law. Guidance is accomplished through the idea that 
individuals should know what information the government is collecting 
about them and how it will be used. Constraints on power are 
accomplished through measures that ensure that information is only 
collected and used in these ways, and that exceptions are clearly outlined 
in public laws.  
The constitutional regime of privacy, in contrast, was developed in 
the law enforcement context where the focus is on unreasonable search 
and seizure. Here the individual interest lies very much in prohibiting 
state collection of information, not in facilitating its access for specific 
purposes. That is because, of course, the law enforcement purpose is 
what brings the individual into a conflictual relationship with the 
coercive role of the state. The paradigm case is one where the state seeks 
a warrant in order to get permission to do something it cannot otherwise 
do — instead of seeking to make its information practices generally 
lawful it is seeking a specific exemption from the law. In order to pursue 
the general rule of law goal of upholding the law, state agents sometimes 
require authorization to do what is otherwise impermissible. This is 
justified only to the extent necessary to uphold the law more generally. 
The basic standard, endorsed in Hunter v. Southam,37 and expressed in 
the Criminal Code, is that the state must show reasonable grounds to 
believe that a crime has been committed and that the search will yield 
evidence (the reasonable and probable grounds standard). Accountability 
measures cannot be ones that rely upon the individual, but instead 
involve an objective party like a judge who determines whether the 
threshold has been met through a process of prior authorization  
(for example, through issuing a warrant).  
One context where it is important to keep in mind these differences 
between the two frameworks is when the data protection law framework 
is invoked as an appropriate model of privacy protection in the context of 
law enforcement or national security. For example, one of the elements 
proposed by President Obama for strengthening the privacy rights of 
non-U.S. persons in relation to U.S. surveillance practices is to extend 
the protections of the U.S. Privacy Act to non-U.S. persons (but not the 
U.S. Fourth Amendment).38 Another example is the “Statement of 
                                                                                                                       
37 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter”]. 
38 Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28”, The White House, 
January 17, 2014, online: The White House <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities>. 
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Privacy Principles by the United States and Canada” associated with the 
Canada-U.S. Beyond the Border Plan, a plan that seeks greater 
information sharing between the two countries for the purposes of border 
security.39 These principles reflect the Fair Information Practices of data 
protection law, not constitutional law.40 And more recently still, the 
Canadian government’s defence of its new anti-terrorism legislation and 
its robust inter-governmental information sharing provisions, relied 
heavily upon the proposition that privacy is protected through the 
application of the federal Privacy Act.41 Given the fact that the paradigm 
for data protection law is not the coercive state-individual relationship 
contemplated by search and seizure law, and given that there are so many 
exceptions for law enforcement and national security in the data 
protection law context, we should be very wary of this pattern of 
enlisting the data protection law model in this way. 
There is some thought that injecting a strong test for necessity and 
proportionality into the data protection law framework can help shore up 
its potential defects.42 As outlined in the introduction, the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada has proposed this as a part of the 
Privacy Impact Assessment process under the Privacy Act, and sees this 
very much as importing a kind of constitutional test for justification for 
limits to privacy. However, the constitutional test that the Privacy 
Commissioner invokes is the Oakes test that governs the interpretation of 
section 1 of the Canadian Charter  which is the general provision that 
allows for limits on constitutional rights and freedoms if they can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. What the Privacy 
Commissioner’s approach does not grapple with is the fact that section 8 
of the Charter, which protects a reasonable expectation of privacy, also 
involves balancing and justification and some of the considerations that 
are appropriate within section 8 are ones that bear consideration when 
seeking to “constitutionalize” data protection law when the latter is 
enlisted in the law enforcement and national security context. 
                                                                                                                       
39 See Beyond the Border Action Plan, “Statement of Privacy Principles by the United States 
and Canada”, Public Safety Canada, May 30, 2012, online: <http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/backgrounder/ 
bap-paf/statement-privacy-principles-united-states-and-canada>. 
40 It might be that, prior to Wakeling, the government did not think that cross-border 
information sharing attracted Charter scrutiny. 
41 See Austin, “Anti-Terrorism’s Privacy”, supra, note 4. 
42 The federal private sector privacy legislation, PIPEDA, achieves a version of this with its 
reasonable purposes test in s. 5(3), which has been interpreted in a manner that follows the Oakes 
test very closely. 
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It is worth emphasizing how the idea of justification that yields the 
reasonable and probable grounds standard in section 8 works differently 
than the section 1 analysis under the Charter. Both incorporate the basic 
ideas of necessity and proportionality that underpin any justificatory test. 
However, of the three parts of the Oakes test — rational connection, 
minimal impairment and the proportionality of deleterious effects — it is 
minimal impairment that is the real workhorse. Although there have been 
a few cases that have discussed the importance of the third prong of the 
test, it rarely does any real work.43 The situation is different with the 
“balancing” internal to the section 8 analysis. “Balancing” always has a 
very feeble sound to it, but there is nothing feeble about the reasonable 
and probable grounds standard. Here, it is not the idea of minimal 
impairment that does all the work. The reasonable and probable grounds 
standard is not about how to permit the state to pursue its law 
enforcement objective while impairing privacy as minimally as possible. 
Instead, it incorporates ideas that are more about the proportionality of 
deleterious effects.  
Such a high standard means that sometimes the law enforcement 
goal will not be met. Indeed, this is contemplated by the section 8 
balancing itself. As Dickson J. states in Hunter, the very question is 
when the individual’s expectation of privacy “must give way to the 
government’s interest in intruding on the individual’s privacy in order 
to advance its goals”.44 The idea is not that privacy must give way so 
long as it is intruded upon as minimally as possible but that law 
enforcement goals hold sway only at a particular point marked by the 
probable effectiveness of reaching that goal. This focus on the likely 
effectiveness of the state action reaching its goal is missing in the 
standard section 1 analysis, in part because that test has been developed 
in the context of reviewing social legislation.45 As the Supreme Court 
cautioned in Hutterian, “a government enacting social legislation is not 
required to show that the law will in fact produce the forecast benefits. 
Legislatures can only be asked to impose measures that reason and the  
 
                                                                                                                       
43 See Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] S.C.J. No. 30, [2007]  
2 S.C.R. 610 (S.C.C.), Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 
2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian”] and New Brunswick (Minister of Health and 
Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.). 
44 Hunter, supra, note 37, at 159-60. 
45 I would like to thank Julia Dryer for this insight. 
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evidence suggest will be beneficial. If legislation designed to further 
the public good were required to await proof positive that the benefits 
would in fact be realized, few laws would be passed and the public 
interest would suffer.”46 However, when the state is using its coercive 
power to act against an individual’s interests in a manner that is usually 
not permitted, then this issue of effectiveness, and proportionality, is of 
crucial importance. 
VI. MERGING FRAMEWORKS? 
If the Charter is going to deal with “Big Data” techniques, then 
Charter privacy jurisprudence needs to continue to move away from 
thinking about “bits” of information and towards thinking about systems 
of information. It also has to move away from thinking about discrete 
informational transactions and think more about the entire process of 
collection, use and disclosure within such systems so that adequate 
safeguards are required. As I have outlined, there are promising signs 
that the jurisprudence is moving in this direction. In doing so, the 
constitutional framework can learn from the data protection law 
framework. At the same time, if the data protection law framework is 
going to provide meaningful privacy protection in the context of Big 
Data techniques for law enforcement and national security purposes, then 
the fact that it has not been developed in the context of the coercive state-
individual relationship at issue in law enforcement and national security 
must be confronted. Developing tests for the “necessity and 
proportionality” of information practices, for example, that do not 
properly attend to the legal contexts in which the tests have been 
developed are unlikely to provide robust privacy protection. Nonetheless, 
something like a merger of the two frameworks is what is required to 
deal with the emerging world of Big Data as it applies within law 
enforcement and national security investigations. This article 
concludes with offering a sketch of a model of what such a merger 
might look like. 
Consider the Snowden revelations concerning the use of airport  
Wi-Fi data in a trial run of a new software program being developed by 
CSE for use in tracking targets. The revealed slides show how the bulk 
collection of the data of people who are not under suspicion at all can be 
                                                                                                                       
46 Hutterian, supra, note 43, at para. 85. 
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used to track and locate an individual who is under investigation  in 
the technique tested it could “be used for any target that makes 
occasional forays into other cities/regions”.47 Spencer would suggest that 
when the technique is used to find a particular network ID of interest 
then matching that ID with other personally identifying information 
would trigger section 8. The Big Data question has to do with what 
happens prior to the identifying moment, when data about a large number 
of people  such as a “sweep” of an entire city  is collected in order 
to find the ID of interest. Many of the new metadata production orders 
and warrants enacted by the recent lawful access provisions in Bill C-13 
allow such information (transmission data and tracking data) to be 
collected on the standard of “reasonable suspicion” that the information 
“will assist in the investigation of the offence”.48 This is a very low 
standard and looks like it is meant to enable the collection and analysis 
of the “haystack”.  
One response is to argue that transmission and tracking data, like 
other forms of metadata, can have the same privacy implications as the 
subscriber information at issue in Spencer, and can be more revealing 
than the contents of communications. If so, it should be protected by the 
higher standard of the general production order in the Criminal Code, 
which is “reasonable grounds to believe … will afford evidence 
respecting the commission of the offence”.49 In other words, access to 
this information should conform to the same standards we apply 
regarding access to the content of communications. 
Another response is to move away from a focus on the “bits” of 
information and focus instead on the information systems, or techniques, 
they are a part of. The issue with metadata is that it is sometimes highly 
revealing and sometimes not, depending on how it is used. Our 
constitutional tests need to capture this “it all depends” quality. Because 
“it all depends” there are also concerns about its misuse — it might be 
used in a manner that is considered minimally privacy-invasive but 
                                                                                                                       
47 The CBC posted the slides online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf>. 
See also Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, “CSEC used airport Wi-Fi to track 
Canadian travellers: Edward Snowden documents”, CBC News, January 30, 2014, online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward- 
snowden-documents-1.2517881>. 
48 See, for example, s. 487.016 of the Criminal Code. 
49 Section 487.014(2). 
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stored insecurely and open to misuse, for example. So this information 
brings along with it a strong concern regarding safeguards. 
One way to get at this would be to think about Big Data techniques 
in three parts. The first would be the development of the technique itself. 
As we can see from the Snowden revelations, these techniques are 
developed and tested for their effectiveness. They should also be subject 
to independent review for their privacy impact, where both privacy law 
experts and technical experts could determine whether the techniques 
could be made more privacy-protective in any way. This would be a kind 
of minimal-impairment analysis and the issue of safeguards would be 
prominent. The second part of the analysis would be judicial oversight of 
the use of the technique. Instead of focusing on permission to collect the 
“bits” of hay in the haystack, the permission sought would be for the 
needle-in-a-haystack technique as a whole. There is no reason why this 
cannot be with the standard warrant or production order process already 
in the Criminal Code  in order to deploy the technique the state would 
have to show that it has reasonable grounds to believe an offence has 
been or will be committed and the use of the technique will afford 
evidence of the offence. If this is authorized, then the information 
collection and use contemplated by the technique  and already 
independently reviewed in the first step  is also authorized. The third 
part of the analysis would be to provide for after-the-fact review. 
Because one of the main privacy concerns regarding the use of such 
techniques is their effect on innocent third parties whose information is 
collected and used, another level of after-the-fact review is important to 
assess the overall effectiveness of such techniques and how this is 
balanced against their overall impact on privacy.  
There are three “moments” then, to this proposal. First, an independent 
privacy impact assessment when developing an investigatory technique. 
Second, judicial oversight in relation to when such techniques can be 
deployed, using the usual standards rather than relaxed standards. 
Third, independent and systemic after-the-fact review aimed at 
understanding whether the overall effectiveness of such techniques is 
proportional to the overall impact on privacy. The proposal makes use 
of aspects of both the constitutional framework for privacy protection 
and the data protection law framework.  
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Increasingly, we will need to find ways to merge the two frameworks 
in order to provide a public law of privacy adequate to the information 
age. This article has tried to offer some initial thoughts on why this is 
important and how it might work, drawing upon recent jurisprudence and 
recent events. What we need is a broader and more sustained critical 
conversation about the public law of privacy in order to meet these 
emerging challenges. 
 
